


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ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT ACCESSIBILITY DURING OPERATIONS
OTHER THAN WAR: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CINC's



by

Edward P. McNamee III
CDR USN

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Operations. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Ed McNamee

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**ABSTRACT of
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THAN WAR: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CINC's**

As the active component of the Army force structure is reduced, an increasingly larger proportion of the force structure will be filled by forces of the Army Reserve and Army National Guard.

The trend toward increased utilization of U.S. armed forces in operations other than war will require a significantly greater degree of participation by units of the Reserve Component, particularly since the lion's share of combat support and combat service support units reside in the reserves.

A study of the mechanics and history of Reserve Component mobilization is provided, along with recent initiatives to improve accessibility to units and individuals of the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve and a consideration of their impact on the CINC.

The high degree of politicization and emotion surrounding Reserve Component readiness issues makes it difficult to make substantial recommendations from either a force planning or operational perspective; however, awareness of the capabilities and limitations of Reserve Component forces will allow planners to make realistic recommendations to the CINC's when the capabilities need do not reside in the Active Component.

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PREFACE

Although this is a paper that demonstrates operational impact on the regional CINC's planners, it is difficult to avoid the force planning aspect of the topic and not make recommendations from a purely operational perspective. The reader should be aware that the force structure of the Reserve Components is changing on an almost daily basis as a result of force reductions and changing roles and missions of the Reserve Components; the data provided is intended to provide an overall impression of reserve contribution by type of mission, not specific information for resource planning.

While the contributions of the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps in OOTW are significant, it was necessary to narrow the scope of the topic to a study of the Army's capabilities in order to keep the information manageable and because the lion's share of this capability clearly exists in the U.S. Army—and specifically—the Reserve Components of the Army.

The following people are gratefully acknowledged for their support and assistance: LTC Hank Alcott, USA; MAJ Frank Hoffman, USMCR; and, COL Roy Pinette, ARNGUS.

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The terms "reserves," "reserve forces," and "Reserve Component" are used interchangeably throughout and refer to both the Army National Guard and the United States Army Reserve. Should the possibility of doubt arise, the particular component is identified.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

*"The shift from a strategy of planning for a massive response to a global war to the need for responding to regional conflicts and other smaller-scale crises, means that the USAR must be ready on short notice."*¹

The latest National Security Strategy has potentially placed planners on the warfighting CINC's staffs in a position of being unable to gain access to military capabilities needed by the new strategy. Although Major Regional Contingencies (MRC) and Lesser Regional Contingencies (LRC) are still the dominant scenarios for the CINC's planners, Operations Other Than War (OOTW) are becoming increasingly emphasized as an essential military capability. Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25), which announced a detachment of U.S. peacekeeping operations from under the aegis of the United Nations, will lessen the overall requirement for the U.S. military's participation in OOTW, the "nation building" and humanitarian support requirements will continue to grow as long as the policy of "enlargement" is in vogue.²

The implication of this for planners is that the military forces they need to support the administration's new strategy, to an increasing degree, reside in the Reserve Components (RC) where federal law and the logistics of mobilization have

institutionalized a lack of faith by the Active Components in RC's ability to respond and perform.

Several initiatives within the RC have been undertaken to resolve questions of readiness and accessibility but do not answer all the questions regarding the speedy deployment of the right capabilities for the duration of the mission. As we begin our discussion, however, it would be worthwhile to review Table 1 to examine those missions that are encompassed within OOTW and how the capabilities of the RC can support those missions.

WHAT THE RESERVE COMPONENT CAN PROVIDE FOR OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

TYPE OF OPERATION	PURPOSE OF MISSION	UNIT TYPE TO SUPPORT MISSION
ARMS CONTROL	Seize/Escort WMD to enhance national and regional security.	CHEMICAL, MEDICAL, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, MILITARY POLICE, TRANSPORTATION
COUNTER-DRUG	C'I, support interdiction and law enforcement	AVIATION, MILITARY INTEL, MILITARY POLICE, POSTAL, TRANSPORTATION
	Support detection and monitoring of drugs entering by air, sea, road & rail.	AVIATION, MILITARY INTEL, MILITARY POLICE, POSTAL, TRANSPORTATION
	Drug prevention and treatment	MEDICAL
NATION ASSISTANCE		
• SECURITY ASSISTANCE	Non-combatant training	CIVIL AFFAIRS, ENGINEERING, MILITARY POLICE, SPECIAL FORCES
• FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE	Support Host nations fight against lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency	CIVIL AFFAIRS, CORPS SUPPORT GROUPS, MILITARY POLICE, MILITARY INTEL, SPECIAL FORCES
NON-COMBATANT EVAC	Safely and quickly remove civilian non-combatants from outside the U.S.	AVIATION, MEDICAL, MILITARY POLICE, SPECIAL FORCES, TRANSPORTATION
CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS	Worldwide humanitarian assistance, support to civil authorities, human and natural disaster relief	AVIATION, AREA SUPPORT GROUPS, ENGINEERS, FIELD SERVICES, MEDICAL, MILITARY, TRANSPORTATION
PEACE OPERATIONS	Peacekeeping and peace enforcement	CORPS SUPPORT GROUPS, FIELD SERVICES, MILITARY POLICE, TRANSPORTATION

Source: Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations and FM 100-5: Operations

Table 1

CHAPTER TWO

The role of the United States Army's Reserve Components

It is incumbent upon planners to understand that there are three components of the Total Army—two of which are Reserve Components (RC)—and each has separate and distinct capabilities. Every branch of the armed services in the United States has a reserve component, but none is as reliant on its reservists as the U.S. Army; nor is any other branch's reserve component as large in percentage, or total numbers, as the Army. Further complicating this mosaic of American combat power is the fact one of these components (the U.S. Army Reserve) is a purely Federal service, while the other (the Army National Guard) reports to both the Secretary of Defense and the state governors. Any discussion of the role and mission of the Army is futile without a basic understanding of the history and evolution of today's Army.

AN IMPORTANT AND DIFFICULT PAST

As a result of his experiences in the American Revolutionary War, George Washington believed that America needed a professional military force. However, many of his peers feared that a standing army would be a regression to the European armies that were established to defend the monarchs of Europe.³ The debate was settled, for the time being, by establishing both a federal military and a state militia to "provide for the common defense." While the Second Amendment of the Constitution provided a balance

by establishing a militia to "ensure the security of a free state," it tempered fears of return to the monarchial standing armies by providing citizens the right "to keep and bear arms."⁴ This, however, left many questions unanswered. In time of war, was the militia the first line of defense until the army came to reinforce them, or was it the other way around?⁵

The years between the Constitutional Congress and the beginning of World War II can best be characterized as a period of extreme resentment of the Guard by officers of the Regular Army. The regulars were highly doubtful of the Guard's readiness and considered the lack of Federal control a major question mark regarding accessibility since governors had the right to determine when their militia could be called to Federal duty.⁶ Additionally, a strong lobby for the National Guard made significant in-roads to greater state control and, at one point, managed to establish the primacy of the Guard in national defense.⁶ As part of the lobby for the Regular Army, former Secretary of War Elihu Root commented, "The idea...that forty-eight different governors can be the basis for developing an efficient mobile national army is quite absurd."⁷ In 1908, the lobby for the Regular Army managed to establish a "Federal Reserve," which initially consisted of medical doctors.

Toward the end of the Viet Nam War, Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams conceived and implemented the force structure that is now known as the "Total Army." President Lyndon Johnson's decision not to mobilize the reserves had far-

⁴ During the Spanish-American War, the governor of Kansas refused to allow the state militia to be federalized.

reaching effects not only on the Army's readiness and morale, but also at the cost of popular support to the war effort. Johnson thought he would be able to fight the war without the reserves, thereby limiting the nation's experience of the war to smaller segments of the population. However, by restricting involvement to active forces, warfighting CINC's from other regions around the world found their commands raped of personnel and equipment as the conflict took its toll on equipment and tour of duty rotations. Additionally, by preventing reserve participation, reserve units were no longer given any priority for replacement of aging equipment and long-time citizen-soldiers—who saw Viet Nam as the perfect opportunity to test their mettle—found themselves standing in formation alongside draft dodgers and others who disapproved of the national policy toward Viet Nam and were using the reserves as a way to avoid service. Abrams' distillation of the difficult lessons learned from that experience were: 1) Mobilizing the Army without the reserves results in significant degradation of both active and reserve forces; 2) In order for the Army to maintain its sense of purpose, it must go to war only with a consensus of popular support.⁸ General Creighton Abrams left his mark on the Army by insuring that the Army would not mobilize without the reserves or go to war without the support of the people.

THE ROLE OF THE ARMY RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD IN TODAY'S ARMY

The Total Army concept allows the Army to "respond rapidly to crises with a mix of trained and ready, active and reserve component forces representing the Total Army... Deployed forces require reserve component participation for combat arms, combat support

(CS) and combat service support (CSS) across Army activities ranging from nation assistance to global war."⁹

Active component personnel are often guilty of summarily lumping together all Reserve Component forces when discussing RC capabilities and limitations; but it is important to note sometimes distinct, but usually subtle and important differences between the components.

Title 10 USC authorizes the formation and directs the Guard and Reserve to provide individuals and units for national emergencies and defense, but the actual functions are determined by Secretary of Defense and formalized in "offsite agreements."¹⁰ The latest iteration of these agreements, with regard to the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve can be summarized as follows:

U.S. Army Reserve provides:

- Trained Individual Ready Reservists to supplement AC units
- The bulk of Army's CS and CSS capability

Army National Guard provides:

- Combat arms units to "Round-out" AC brigades and divisions.

Additionally, National Guardsmen are under the direction of state governors unless called into federal service in accordance with the various sections of Title 10, as outlined in chapter three. In this way, governors can use the National Guard in a police function in the event of a state emergency. Once federalized, the Posse Comitatus Act prevents Federal soldiers from performing law enforcement functions if civil authorities are still

operating;¹¹ National Guardsmen would therefore lose the search and arrest role that governors are able to employ during events such as the 1991 Los Angeles riots.

CHAPTER THREE

The Active Component/Reserve Component Mix

Tables 2 demonstrate the contributions of ARNG and USAR to the Total Army. As the roles of nation building, humanitarian support, and peacekeeping operations take a larger part in the day-to-day operations of national defense activities, the demands on combat support and combat service support units will grow. Unit types that provide greater than fifty percent of the Total Army capability are likely to provide the CINC's planners the greatest difficulty in accessibility.

Army National Guard and Army Reserve Contributions to the Total Army¹²

<u>Unit Types</u>	<u>Army National Guard Number Units</u>	<u>Army Reserve Number Units</u>	<u>Combined Percent of Total Army</u>
Water Supply Battalions	2	3	100%
Enemy Prisoner of War Brigades	0	1	100%
Theater Support Groups	0	1	100%
Heavy Helicopter Units	3	0	100%
Judge Advocate General Units	4	137	100%
Civil Affairs Units ^b	0	36	100%
Petroleum Support Battalions	7	6	93%
Public Affairs Units	32	26	87%
Medical Brigades	3	9	86%
Medical Groups	3	7	77%
Maintenance Battalions	21	17	73%
Corps Support Groups	4	15	73%
Psychological Operation Units ^c	0	36	72%
Transportation Battalions	10	14	71%
Petroleum Groups	0	2	67%
Hospital Units	21	50	66%
Terminal Battalions	0	4	57%
Military Police Battalions	9	7	55%
Corps Support Command	2	2	50%
Area Support Groups	8	8	45%
Military Intelligence Battalions	7	15	39%
Engineer Battalions (Topographical)	1	0	24%

Table 2.

^b Units sourced through US Special Operations Command.

^c Units sourced through US Special Operations Command.

CHAPTER FOUR

MOBILIZATION: The Key to Reserve Accessibility

TITLE 10 USC AND ITS IMPACT ON CINC PLANNING

None of the capabilities of RC forces is available to the CINC until members or units of the reserve component force are mobilized in accordance with the various options of Title 10 United States Code. Although there are at least twelve different sections of Title 10 dealing with reserve mobilization, they are easily categorized into six "uses" and are outlined in Table 3.

Within the armed conflict scenarios presented under previous National Security Strategies built around the concept of "containment," war planners were presented with considerably fewer difficulties regarding the Reserve Components. Any wartime deployment of the Active Component would necessitate the immediate support of the Reserve Component (which contained the majority of Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) responsibilities). Now, CS and CSS units are the very units that contain the Operations Other Than War (OOTW) capabilities implied in the new strategy of "enlargement."

CALL-UP OPTIONS AND RESTRICTIONS

Table 3 outlines the situations and restrictions for mobilizing RC forces. Day-to-day routine operations, where AC forces are used almost exclusively, is described by

Situation 1; warfighting CINC's are assigned active duty personnel and may use them for any military purpose.

Recent initiatives to increase accessibility of RC forces, described in chapter five, use the provisions of federal law outlined in Situation 2. In most cases of mobilization planning, entire units are called to active duty. However, individuals with a needed Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) may volunteer for service. The advantage here is that volunteering reservists can fill a need without resorting to Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC), and those individuals who do volunteer do not count against the limitations imposed by law when a PSRC is undertaken. Two disadvantages to this provision are: 1) State governors must approve volunteer activation of their National Guardsmen; and, 2) Reservists on active duty for greater than 179 days, or on active duty spanning one fiscal year into another, count against the authorized strength of the Active Component.

For scenarios requiring the participation of more than a few individual volunteers, RC forces would be mobilized under Title 10 USC 673 (b) as described in Situation 3. This was the case when 245,000 reservists^d were ordered to active duty during Operation DESERT STORM.

Situations 4 and 5 would be pre-indicated by scenarios of national emergency or war, and Situation 6 is limited to domestic emergencies only.

^d This number represents the total number of reservists from all services throughout Operations DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM and residual operations.

MOBILIZATION AUTHORITIES¹³

SITUATION	ACTION REQUIRED	AUTHORITY	PERSONNEL INVOLVED	REMARKS
1. Any requirement.	Operational order	Commander-in-Chief	Active duty forces	Used for any military purpose
2. Any level of emergency	Publish order to active duty	10 USC 672 (d) 10 USC 688 (a)	Volunteers from National Guard and Reserves. Retired members of the Regular Army and Army Reserve with 20 years of active service. May be ordered to active service involuntarily.	May be used for any lawful purpose. <u>Consent of the governor is required for ARNG members serving under 10 USC 672 (d).</u>
3. Operational mission requiring augmentation of active force (Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up)	Presidential Executive Order	10 USC 673 (b)	Units and individuals of Selected Reserve (NG & USAR); limited to 200,000 (all services) for up to 90 days and extendable for another 90 days.	President must report to Congress within 24 hours of circumstances and anticipated use of forces. May not be used in lieu of a call-up (10 USC 331 et seq, 3500, 8500) or for disaster relief.
4. Contingency operation, war plan, national emergency (partial mobilization)	Presidential proclamation of a national emergency and executive order	10 USC 637	Ready Reserve units and Individual Ready Reserve (NG and USAR); limited to 1,000,000 (all services) for up to 2 years.	President may extend appointments, enlistments and periods of service when Congress is not in session. 10 USC 671 (b).
5. War or national emergency (full or total mobilization)	Passage of a public law or joint resolution by the Congress declaring war or national emergency	10 USC 671 (a) 10 USC 672 10 USC 674 10 USC 675	National Guard and Reserve units, Individual Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, members of Retired Reserve. No numerical or time limitation unless established by Congress	May extend enlistments in Regular and Reserve forces and extend period of active service for duration of the war plus 6 months
6. Domestic emergency. (Selective mobilization)	Presidential proclamation to disperse under 10 USC 334 and executive order under 10 USC appropriate to purpose of the call	10 USC 3500 10 USC 8500 10 USC 331 10 USC 332 10 USC 333	National Guard and Reserves	May be used for Federal aid to states in case of insurrection (10 USC 331); to enforce federal authority (10 USC 332); to suppress interference with state and federal law (10 USC 333).

Table 3

THE MECHANICS OF MOBILIZATION

The process of getting RC personnel from their Home Station to the Point of Debarkation (POD) in theater is not much different than getting AC personnel and units to their POD. However, two important steps are added to the RC process, as described in FM 100-17¹⁴. Although the process closely resembles the manner in which AC units would get ready for deployment and arrive in theater, two key additions are mission essential training and validation. For combat maneuver units, training and validation can take several months; for some CS and CSS units the period can cover less than one week. Under the "Total Force" concept, RC units would undergo advanced unit level training and arrive behind AC units already in theater.

Training. In AC units, personnel and unit training are conducted throughout the year and are integrated into exercises and deployment operations. RC units, however, emphasize individual MOS training during drill periods; integration of personnel into cohesive unit actions is done primarily during unit training, following activation, at the mobilization station.¹⁵

Validation. AC units are required to maintain a level of readiness consistent with the CINC's deployment requirements. But for RC units, deployability is not judged until after the unit is mobilized and trained.¹⁶

Both the USAR and ARNG have recently developed programs that enhance unit readiness and should ultimately decrease the time required for training and validation. Many in the AC recognize the success that Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units have had in maintaining high states of readiness. Modeling their systems after the

Operational Readiness Evaluation (ORE) of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, Army National Guard and Army Reserve units hope to be able to keep units in a relatively constant state of readiness and will be re-evaluated approximately every two years. According to LTC James Hesse, project manager for the National Guard Bureau's Contingency Force Pool, "The Air Guard saw the writing on the wall; Air Force regulars fully integrated their Guard and Reserve forces ten to fifteen years ago while Army was only paying lip service to the "Total Force" concept."¹⁷

It is important to note, by law, units will not be deployed unless operationally ready. The validation process is what determines that a unit is ready to be deployed by the CINC.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

Each provision of Title 10 that deals with activation of RC forces was apparently written to be applied differently under varying scenarios and places different limitations on their use. Several historical examples are provided to help the reader better understand how the law allows the use of the reserves.

The earliest example of reserve call-up under Title 10 was during World War II. Since Congress had declared war, both Army and Navy activated reserve units across the country; additionally, individual reservists, and in some cases Retired members, were called up for the duration of the war plus six months. (Refer to Situation 5, Table 3).

During the Korean War, although no war was declared, a partial mobilization was executed and members of the Army National Guard's 45th Division (the "Thunderbirds"

of the Oklahoma National Guard) were activated and deployed. (Refer to Situation 4, Table 3).

President George Bush called approximately 245,000 reservists (all services) to serve during Operation DESERT STORM, approximately 106,000 served in Southwest Asia during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.¹⁸ Title 10 USC 673 (b) allowed for the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) without a declaration of war or national emergency. Reservists were called up for ninety days and many were automatically extended under a provision of the law that allows for an additional ninety-day extension. (Refer to Situation 3, Table 3).

The portions of Title 10 that deal with domestic emergencies give the president the authority to call-up reservists to enforce federal authority. This was the case when National Guardsmen were activated during Operation Graphic Hand when postal workers struck the U.S. Post Office in 1970.¹⁹ (Refer to Situation 6, Table 3).

Recent initiatives to increase Reserve Component accessibility within the provisions of Title 10 are outlined in Chapter Five.

THE PROBLEM WITH CURRENT CAPSTONE ALIGNMENTS

Units of the Reserve Component are assigned missions through the Army's CAPSTONE program²⁰. CAPSTONE provides the warfighting CINC's both active and reserve units which are prioritized for deployment and onward movement to the area of operations by incorporation in Time Phased Force Deployment Lists (TPFDL).

Prior to Operation Desert Storm, RC units knew which active commands they would be assigned to. But during Desert Storm, according to a study released by the Strategic Studies Institute, "[RC] units were not mobilized, used for "fillers," went with another parent unit, or sent to an area other than the area specified and trained for."²¹ Today, it seems, there is little faith in the CAPSTONE program demonstrated by RC unit commanders. Having a CAPSTONE alignment with a particular AC unit, and training for a specific area, is no guarantee that RC units and individuals won't be "shuffled around in one manner or another."²²

Although active unit commanders and CINC's will readily argue their prerogative to use assigned personnel and units wherever they see fit, AC units would not have personnel nearly as trained and ready as they were for Southwest Asia without CAPSTONE.²³ CINC's should insist on working with their reserve component units and ensuring those units are familiar with the CINC's OPPLAN's and area of responsibility.

One important *caveat* exists; although all units should have a primary CAPSTONE alignment with a single "parent unit," individual units could find themselves on the TPFDL of several OPPLANS simultaneously. In other words, there are not enough of these units to go around.²⁴

CHAPTER FIVE

Programs to Improve Reserve Accessibility

In a move to enhance readiness of the Total Army and increase accessibility of critical specialties, the Department of the Army established a pool of critical support units. Called the Contingency Force Pool (CFP), it consists of active and reserve units in the Combat Arms, Combat Service and Combat Service Support branches and is designed to enhance operational readiness and availability for immediate deployment of units and individuals.²⁵ Two programs have been established by the Guard and Reserve that assign the highest priority to target units for funding, manpower, training, and equipment.

PROJECT STANDARD BEARER

Project STANDARD BEARER is the National Guard's contribution to the Contingency Force Pool and emphasizes availability of ARNG units for federal service. Within Project STANDARD BEARER there are three sub-programs supporting the CFP.

Operational Unit Program. Approximately 55 of the highest priority ARNG's CFP units have been designated as "Operational Units;" thirty-eight of those are to be available within seven days of an alert.²⁶ A list of units participating in the Operational Unit Program appears at Appendix A.

Humanitarian Support Unit Program. This program provides approximately 89 units in a volunteer status to respond to worldwide humanitarian missions. Nineteen of the units are available within 72 hours of alert and can remain on station for up to 45

days. The remaining units can be used for rotation purposes. A list of the units participating in the ARNG Humanitarian Support Program appears at Appendix B.²⁷

Operational Integration Program. This program has been modelled after the Operation DESERT STORM Residual Force to assist the Army in performing Forward Presence and Peacekeeping missions. In this case, ARNG and active Army soldiers would be combined, trained, and deployed for six-month rotations.²⁸ The first test of this concept will be undertaken in 1995 when a unit comprising of active, National Guard, and Army Reserve personnel will form and begin training in October, 1994 for a six-month tour in the Sinai for peacekeeping operations.²⁹

PROJECT PRIME

While ARNG's emphasis in Project STANDARD BEARER is unit accessibility, Army Reserve's Project PRIME stresses availability of Individual Ready Reservists and higher unit readiness ratings. PRIME's advantage's are that it identifies individuals with critical Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) and recent release from active duty service to enhance overall unit readiness.³⁰

SAME STRATEGY, DIFFERENT EMPHASIS

At first glance, ARNG's Project STANDARD BEARER and USAR's Project PRIME offer the same thing, accessibility to reserve forces. A closer look reveals each offers a way for the Department of the Army to source reservists to the CINC's without

requiring a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up; PRIME offers individuals at a high state of readiness (since targeted individuals in critical MOS's have more recent active service and more training), STANDARD BEARER will get the CINC an entire unit—but at a lower overall readiness level.

The strategy of both programs is to increase RC availability (ostensibly for humanitarian, peacekeeping, or forward presence missions) without requiring PSRC. In the case of National Guardsmen, Title 10 requires the state governor's permission before units or individuals are federalized; the National Guard Bureau has developed a Memorandum of Agreement with the states that essentially consents to federalization of identified units, but protects individuals from recall without the governor's consent. Individuals may volunteer for active duty at any time.

The USAR perspective appears to be that any crisis will require a PSRC to get an entire unit on the scene; in critical MOS's volunteers are essential, but on a broader scale "the volunteer rate will be situational and seasonally dependent."³¹ As one Army Reserve planner bluntly stated, "Volunteers can un-volunteer themselves any time they like!"³²

HOW DO THEY FIT INTO THE CINC'S PLANS?

Do these programs offered by the Guard and Reserves provide significant improvement in accessibility to RC forces, or are they just tinkering at the margins? Amidst harrowing force reductions, every community within each branch of service is offering "product improvements" to enhance their value. While these programs do not

represent any changes in the way Title 10 call-ups are interpreted, they can help CINC's get the Reserves capabilities into theater faster. "In the event a PSRC would be necessary," explains LTC George Rollins, the Reserve Forces Advisor to J-7, "the volunteers can already be on their way to where you need them. They're saying, 'I'm ready to go before I'm activated.'"³³

CHAPTER SIX

Conclusions and Recommendations

Our tradition in the military for planning combat operations has been to concentrate on getting to the battle and fighting the war. That same tradition has been to expend as little effort as possible on the endgame of peace enforcement and reconstruction, establishing *ad hoc* peacekeeping units, and conducting "come as you are" humanitarian support missions. Operations other than war are getting too much attention to be taken lightly, and as part of the National Security Strategy they deserve the same consideration for the adjudication of risk as a combat operation would receive.

Given that any shift of RC organization, roles, and missions is a highly politicized and emotional issue, several recommendations can be brought forth to enhance the CINC's ability to bring these capabilities to bear on OOTW.

From a force planning perspective, two suggestions clearly come to mind: 1) Give the Secretary of Defense a limited call-up authority; 2) Move more CS/CSS units into active service.

Legislation to give the Secretary of Defense limited call-up authority is currently being staffed in Congress. A limited call-up authority of approximately 25,000 reservists (all services) would give the CINC's access to those capabilities as, ostensibly, the National Command Authority would not direct the CINC's to conduct an operation if they

were not adequately sourced. Additionally, a limited call-up would not demand the same degree of popular support that is inherent in a PSRC.

Shifting combat support and combat service support units into active service is an even more complex force planning issue that answers the immediate problem of accessibility, but it would require an offset-in-kind of other functions in the AC. The degree that CS/CSS units are shifted into the AC will rely upon direction from the National Military Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance to indicate a willingness to make further cuts in combat arms units in the AC and increase the emphasis on planning for OOTW—that is currently not the case.

Of more immediate value to the CINC's are the initiatives being taken by the National Guard and Army Reserve to increase volunteer response time and identifying units that are prepared to go into service prior to PSRC. It must be emphasized that whether reserves volunteer, or are activated by a Federal call-up, they cannot deploy until they are validated.

CINC's should be asking their planners three questions: 1) Do the component commanders maintain liaisons with those RC units to keep them abreast of current planning scenarios?; 2) Of the RC units that the CINC can expect to have assigned to him, where do they stand in the validation process?; and, 3) Is there a list of commercial contractors, along with contractors response times, capabilities and even memoranda of agreement?

While few recommendations can be made for improving the accessibility of reserves, short of changes to Title 10, it is equally useful for planners to be familiar with

the capabilities and limitations of the RC. When an operation can be conducted, but only with the participation of certain RC capabilities, the planner must articulate it to the CINC—particularly when subsequent branches or sequels are affected.

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APPENDIX A

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OPERATIONAL UNIT PROGRAM

The following units have been organized as volunteer Operational Units. This unit list is updated regularly. These units are available to report for active duty and deploy to support Army contingency missions within 7 days of notification.

STATE	UNIT
AL	1200 Quartermaster HQ (Headquarters Detachment) Battalion Water Support
AL	1206 Quartermaster Det Water Purification
AL	1207 Quartermaster Det Water Distribution
AL	1208 Quartermaster CO Water Supply
AL	131 Aviation Battalion
AL	650 Ordnance Company (Ammunition)
AL	1659 Transportation Corps Det Movement Control
AR	875 Engineering Battalion Combat Corps
AR	1122 Transportation Corps Company Light Medium Truck
CA	224 Transportation Corps Det Movement Control
CO	1157 Transportation Corps Det Movement Control
CO	1158 Transportation Corps Det Movement Control
GA	24th Division Infantry Det
IL	708 Medical CO (Ambulance)
IN	1015 Adjutant General CO (Postal)
MD	200 Military Police CO
ME	112 Medical CO (Air Ambulance)
ME	314 Medical CO (Ambulance)
MI	460 Quartermaster CO
MI	1432 Engineering CO
MI	1436 Engineering CO
MS	1st Division Armor Det
NC	130 Aviation Battalion
NC	1454 Transportation Corps Medium Truck (Cargo)

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OPERATIONAL UNIT PROGRAM (cont'd.)

STATE	UNIT
ND	133 Quartermaster Det (Water Supply)
ND	957 Engineering CO
NH	744 Transportation Corps (Medium Truck)
NM	720 Transportation Corps (Heavy Truck)
OH	137 Aviation HQ (HQ Det)
OK	158 Field Artillery Battalion (MLRS)
OK	1045 Ordnance Maintenance
OK	1545 Ordnance Maintenance
RI	219 Quartermaster Det (Water Purification)
SC	51 Combat Support (Rear Area Operations Control)
SC	116 Transportation Corps (Movement Control)
SC	122 Engineering Battalion (Combat Corps)
SC	251 Combat Support (Rear Area Operations Control)
SD	109 Engineering Battalion HQ (HQ Det)
SD	109 Engineering Group HQ (HQ Det)
SD	153 Engineering Battalion
SD	211 Engineering CO
SD	842 Engineering CO
SD	1742 Transportation Corps CO (Medium Truck)
TN	30 Quartermaster HQ (HQ Det) (Petroleum Supply)
TN	1175 Quartermaster CO (Petroleum Supply)
TN	1176 Quartermaster CO (Petroleum Supply)
UT	120 Quartermaster Det (Water Purification)
VA	1030 Engineering HQ (HQ Det) Battalion Service
WA	1344 Transportation Corps Det (Movement Control)
WA	241 Transportation Corps Det (Movement Control)
WA	1244 Transportation Corps Det (Cargo Documentation)
WV	152 Military Police Det

APPENDIX B

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT PROGRAM

STATE	UNITS
AL	131 Public Affairs Division
AL	1133 Medical CO (Air Ambulance)
AL	877 Engineer BN
AL	1165 Military Police CO
AL	1166 Military Police CO
AL	217 Military Police CO
AL	1670 Transportation Corps CO
AL	129 Medical CO
AL	CO F, 131 Aviation BN (CH-47)
AL	167 Support Command
AL	145 Engineer HQ BN (HQ Det)
AL	20 Special Forces Group HQ CO
AL	20 Special Forces Group (Support CO)
AL	20 Special Forces Group 1st BN
AR	39 SIB (Surgery & Triage) CO A
AR	39 SIB (Medical) CO C
AR	204 Medical Det
AR	1123 Transportation Corps (Car)
AR	239 Engineer CO, 39 SIB

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT UNIT PROGRAM (cont'd.)

STATE	UNIT
AR	216 Medical CO (Ambulance)
AR	404 Medical Det (Dispensary)
AR	448 Aviation Det (CECAT)
AZ	124 Public Affairs Division
AZ	855 Military Police CO
CA	670 Military Police CO
CA	140 Aviation CO G
DC	715 Public Affairs Division
DC	547 Transportation Corps CO
IL	139 Public Affairs Division
IL	126 Combat Support CO
IL	258 Combat Support CO
IL	634 FSB (Medical) CO C
IL	1244 Transportation Corps CO / 1644 Transportation Corps CO
IL	933 Military Police CO
IL	233 Military Police CO
IN	113 Medical BN CO A (Follow-on only)
IN	38 Surgery & Triage BN CO B (Follow-on only)
IN	1413 Engineer Det

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT UNIT PROGRAM (cont'd)

STATE	UNIT
IN	120 Public Affairs Division
ME	1136 Transportation Corps CO
MI	1176 Military Police CO
MN	257 Military Police CO
MN	134 FSB (Medical) CO C
MN	125 Public Affairs Division
MS	785 Engineer Det
MO	203 Engineer BN CO A
MO	2175 Military Police CO
NE	67 Corps Support Bn (FWD) CO C
NH	1159 Medical CO (Air Ambulance)
NY	138 Public Affairs Division
NY	206 Military Police CO
NY	342 FSB (Medical) CO C
NY	2/142 Aviation CO A
NY	2/142 Aviation CO B
NY	2/142 Aviation CO C
NC	505 Engineer BN (1 Company)
NC	514 Military Police CO
NC	211 Military Police CO

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT UNIT PROGRAM (cont'd.)

STATE	UNIT
NC	213 Military Police CO
NC	105 Engineer GP (HQ CO)
NC	167 Military Police BN (HQ CO)
ND	191 Military Police CO
OH	196 Public Affairs Division
OK	145 Public Affairs Division
OK	1245 Transportation Corps CO
PA	109 Public Affairs Division
PA	104 Aviation BN CO G (CH-47)
PA	876 Engineer BN CO A
PA	213 Area Support GP (HQ CO)
PR	755 Military Police CO
PR	544 Military Police CO
PR	240 Military Police CO
PR	162 Field Service CO
PR	201 Evac Hospital
PR	1/192 Aviation BN CO B
PR	1/192 Aviation BN (HQ CO)
PR	892 Engineer CO

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT UNIT PROGRAM (cont'd.)

STATE	UNIT
PR	192 Support BN CO C
SD	235 General Supply CO
TN	268 Military Police CO
TN	194 Engineer BDE (HQ CO)
TX	100 Public Affairs Division
TX	149 Aviation BN CO E
UT	1250 Medical CO (Air Ambulance)
VA	229 Military Police CO
VA	986 Medical CO (Air Ambulance)
WA	Det 1, HQ STARC
WA	1/106 Aviation BN CO C
WI	832 Medical CO (Air Ambulance)

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